21世纪的纳米科技与纳米军事

纳米军事是纳米科技应用发展的重要方面,并将成为21世纪战场的主宰.纳米武器将使人们重新认识军事领域中数量与质量的关系,产生全新的战争理念,使武器装备的研制与生产向质量、智能的方向发展,从而变革未来战争的面貌和形态.     

关于在公安现役部队推行全面预算管理的几点思考

对现阶段公安现役部队全面预算管理现状和面临的问题进行了分析,从确定部队战略目标,党委重视和全员参与,构建全面预算管理组织结构及制度体系,全面预算的编制、控制、调整及考评等几个方面提出了有效实施全面预算管理的思路和具体措施。     

新时期编辑出版人才培养的战略选择

21世纪是高新技术不断爆发的时代，就出版业而言，以多媒体技术为基础的数字、网络出版物日益多样化、个性化，基于网络出版和电子商务的普及，按需编辑出版、即时印刷的网络编辑出版模式冲击着传统的编辑出版模式，出版业市场的新变化对编辑出版人才提出了新的要求。本文结合出版业市场对编辑出版人才的新要求，分析了现在编辑出版人才的培养方式存在的问题，提出了新时期编辑出版人才培养的战略选择。     

How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?

The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This article seeks to answer a basic question: How durable is the taboo? We develop different predictions about norm durability depending on whether the taboo is based primarily on moral logic or strategic logic. We use the comparable case of the norm against strategic bombing in the 20th century to evaluate these hypotheses. The logic and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the norm of nuclear non-use is much more fragile than most analysts understand.     

基于共词分析的国内语言规划与政策研究现状分析

本文以中国学术期刊网收录的1637篇文献记录为分析对象,利用聚类分析、战略坐标分析和社会网络分析等方法,对国内语言规划与政策领域的主要研究方向、发展状态和核心作者群进行分析。研究结果表明,国内语言规划与政策研究主要涉及八个方向:少数民族语言研究、官方语言研究、语言态度研究、推广普通话研究、方言研究、外语研究、语言问题研究、语言文字规范研究。其中,少数民族语言研究、官方语言研究和方言研究处于领域核心且发展比较成熟。推广普通话研究也是领域关注的核心问题,但目前发展尚不成熟。相比之下,语言态度研究、外语研究、语言文字规范研究和语言问题研究相对处于领域边缘且尚不够成熟。围绕各个研究方向均已形成了较稳定的杰出作者群体,多数学者都反映出"多主题跟进、单主题深入"的研究模式。     

Global strategic studies: a manifesto

This contribution reflects on the state of strategic studies today and the criticism it has received in recent years, as being outdated and irrelevant. The authors formulate some premises for reinvigorating this field of inquiry by widening its scope and research agenda to do more justice to the wide variety of actors, perspectives and practices observable in the enterprise of strategy in our contemporary globalised world.     

The underlying causes of military outsourcing in the USA and UK: bridging the persistent gap between ends,ways and means since the beginning of the Cold War

This article reappraises the two most-studied country cases of military outsourcing: the USA and the UK. It argues that the contemporary wave of military contracting stretches back to the beginning of the cold war and not only to the demobilisation of armies in the 1990s or the neoliberal reforms introduced since the 1980s. It traces the political, technological and ideational developments that laid the groundwork for these reforms and practices since the early cold war and account for its endurance today. Importantly, it argues that a persistent gap between strategic objectives and resources, i.e. the challenge to reconcile ends and means, is an underlying driver of military contracting in both countries. Contemporary contracting is thus most closely tied to military support functions in support of wider foreign and defence political objectives. Security services in either state may not have been outsourced so swiftly, if at all, without decades of experience in outsourcing military logistics functions and the resultant vehicles, processes and familiarities with public-private partnerships. The article thus provides a wider and deeper understanding of the drivers of contractualisation, thereby improving our understanding of both its historical trajectory and the determinants of its present and potential futures.     

Strategic spectrum occupancy for secondary users in cognitive radio networks with retrials

This article investigates joining strategies and admission control policy for secondary users (SUs) with retrial behavior in a cognitive radio (CR) system where a single primary user (PU) coexists with multiple SUs. Under a certain reward‐cost structure, SUs opportunistically access the PU band when it is not occupied by the PU. If the band is available upon arrival, an SU decides with a probability either to use the band immediately or to balk the system. If the band is occupied, the SU must decide whether to enter the system as a retrial customer or to leave the system. Once the PU requests for service, the service of SU being served, if any, will be interrupted, and the interrupted SU leaves the band and retries for service after a random amount of time. In this article, we study the equilibrium behavior of non‐cooperative SUs who want to maximize their benefit in a selfish, distributed manner with delay‐sensitive utility function. The socially optimal strategies of SUs are also derived. To utilize the PU band more efficiently and rationally, an admission control policy is proposed to regulate SUs who enter the system in order to eliminate the gap between the individually and socially optimal strategies.     

EDITOR'S NOTE

This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to “low numbers” (defined as 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons on each side). These risks might include US anti-cities targeting strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to Russian noncompliance with agreed obligations; incentives to adopt destabilizing “launch-on-warning” strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation; perceptions of a US disengagement from extended deterrence; increased likelihood of non-nuclear arms competitions and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and French nuclear forces. Observers in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states who consider such risks significant have cited four possible measures that might help to contain them: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness means to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the consultations with the NATO allies that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such important adjustments in its deterrence and defense posture.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.